In the ever-evolving world of automotive technology, infotainment systems are becoming increasingly sophisticated, connecting drivers to their devices in ways that enhance the driving experience. However, this connectivity also opens the door to potential vulnerabilities. Recently, I discovered an SQL injection vulnerability in the Visteon infotainment systems that are used in many Mazda vehicles. Specifically, the vulnerability is related to how those systems handle the IAPSERIAL value of Apple iPods connected via USB. In this blog post, we’ll explore the details of this vulnerability and its implications.
Understanding IAP and iPod Serial Numbers
First, a little explanation of the iPod Accessory Protocol (IAP) is in order. IAP enables both hosts and accessories to communicate with iPods, allowing for functionalities like audio playback, control, and information exchange. When an iPod or other Apple device is connected to an IAP-capable endpoint, several bits of information, such as device model and capabilities, are exchanged in order to establish communication. One such piece of information is the iPod’s serial number, which is a unique hardcoded string used to identify the specific Apple device connected to the endpoint (in this case, the Mazda’s infotainment system).
According to the “iPod Accessory Protocol Specification” (which I will not link to here as it is supposed to be a closed spec, but there are leaked copies and open-source implementations out there for the savvy searcher to find), the iPod serial number is a null-terminated UTF-8 character array that is returned in response to a “Command 0x0B: RequestiPodSerialNum” packet. Let’s take a closer look at how Mazda’s infotainment system requests this value and handles the response.
The Vulnerability Unveiled
Whenever a new device is plugged into the USB port of the Mazda’s infotainment system, it is handled by /jci/devicemanager/libdevicemanager.so. A function called vDevMgrProcessDeviceConnectedDevd() attempts to figure out what kind of device it is, queries it for various pieces of information, and checks an SQLite database to see if the device has been connected to the car before. If it is discovered to be a new IAP device, its information is sent to the eInsertDeviceEntry() function where it inserts the values of USBSERIAL, MACADDRESS, IAPSERIAL, and UIDVALID into the DeviceInfo table.
Unfortunately, the way these values are passed directly inside an SQL statement without any attempts at sanitization leaves it vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. If an attacker were to connect a spoofed or modified “iPod” that were to return a string along the lines of ' , 0); [MALICIOUS SQL STATEMENT];-- within the response to a RequestiPodSerialNum packet, the system would process this malicious input without proper validation and execute it just like any other SQL statement. And because this is an SQLite database, the attacker could even use known exploitation techniques to turn this injection into full code execution and compromise the entire system.
Mitigation Strategies
Unfortunately, as seen in the advisory here, Visteon was contacted with details of this vulnerability but never responded, so the details were released without a fix in place. As such, it is advisable to make people aware that this issue exists so that they can protect themselves. The most effective mitigation for this attack, of course, is to simply not plug unknown or untrusted devices into your car’s USB port. This is honestly an important strategy to follow no matter what make and model of car you drive.
As vehicles become more interconnected, the importance of robust security measures in infotainment systems cannot be overstated. This vulnerability in Mazda infotainment systems serves as a reminder that even seemingly innocuous features can harbor significant security risks. By implementing best practices for input handling and regularly auditing their systems, manufacturers can enhance the security of their vehicles and protect users from potential threats.
It’s crucial for automotive companies to prioritize cybersecurity in their development processes, ensuring that innovations do not come at the cost of user safety and data privacy. As we move forward, vigilance in addressing these vulnerabilities will be key to building trust in automotive technology.