In a significant regulatory shift, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has moved to safeguard national interests by tightening rules around device certification labs. The decision, gaining unanimous support, confronts the security risks allegedly posed by testing bodies with connections to foreign adversaries such as China. This development follows consistent attempts by the U.S. to address potential national security threats posed by certain international entities.
The focus is on “bad labs,” a term designated for laboratories potentially influenced by foreign powers. “While the agency has in recent years barred entities on the FCC’s Covered List from having their devices approved for use in the U.S. due to determinations that such devices pose national security risks, these new rules ensure that the accreditation and certification bodies and test labs are themselves not untrustworthy actors,” the FCC stated.
Previously, the authority of test labs was determined by their technical competence rather than their national affiliations. Companies around the world rely on these certifications for devices transmitting radio frequencies governed by the FCC’s regulations. However, newer regulations demand that labs prove freedom from foreign influence.
The reforms, championed by Brendan Carr, now FCC chairman and a vocal advocate for stringent security measures, mirror a broader effort to identify and mitigate security concerns linked to the telecommunications infrastructure. “Foreign adversaries like China are engaged in a multi-pronged effort to identify and exploit any vulnerabilities in our communications infrastructure,” said Carr.
A contentious aspect of this rule is rooted in the potential diplomatic ripples it could cause. Several labs suspected of connections to the Chinese Communist Party have certified numerous devices for the U.S. market. Their exclusion sparks concerns about a ripple effect, possibly hindering the supply of consumer electronic devices.
Simultaneously, the FCC is launching an initiative to track the ownership and influence of foreign entities holding licenses in the U.S. This proactive approach, Carr asserts, aims to close information gaps and create a comprehensive overview of foreign influence within U.S. communications infrastructure.