Israel’s electronic pager attacks targeting Hezbollah in September highlighted the dangerous ramifications of a weaponized supply chain. The attacks, which leveraged remotely detonated explosives hidden inside pager batteries, injured nearly 3,000 people across Lebanon, as a worst-case reminder of the inherent risk that lies within global supply networks.
The situation wasn’t just another doomsday scenario crafted by financially motivated vendors hoping to sell security products. It was a legitimate, real-world byproduct of our current reality amid the escalating proliferation of adversarial cybercrime. It also underscored the dangers of relying on third-party hardware and software, with roots back to foreign countries of concern — something that happens more often than one might expect. For example, on Sept. 12, a US House Select Committee Investigation revealed that 80% of the ship-to-shore cranes at American ports are manufactured by a single Chinese government-owned company. While the committee did not find evidence that the company used its access maliciously, the vulnerability could have enabled China to manipulate US maritime equipment and technology in the wake of geopolitical conflict.
As nation-state actors explore new avenues for gaining geopolitical advantage, securing supply chains must be a shared priority amongst the cybersecurity community in 2025. Verizon’s “2024 Data Breach Investigations Report” found that the use of zero-day exploits to initiate breaches surged by 180% year-over-year — and among them, 15% involved a third-party supplier. The right vulnerability at the wrong time can put critical infrastructure in the crosshairs of a consequential event.